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Abstract-
 
Wireless
 
Sensor network routing protocols are prone 
to various attacks as these protocols mainly provide the 
function of routing data towards the sink. LEACH is a one of 
the routing protocol used for clustered implementation of 
wireless sensor network with Received Signal Strength based 
dynamic selection of Cluster Heads. But, as with other routing 
protocols, LEACH is also prone to HELLO flood attack when 
the malicious sensor node becomes the Cluster Head. 
Cryptographic and non-cryptographic approaches to detect 
the presence of HELLO flood attack also exist but they lack 
efficiency in some way. In this paper, an efficient protocol is 
proposed for the detection and prevention of HELLO Flood 
attack in wireless sensor network. Cluster heads are vulnerable 
to various malicious attacks and this greatly affects the 
performance of the wireless sensor network. Cryptographic 
approaches to prevent this attack are not so helpful though 
some non-cryptographic methods to detect the HELLO Flood 
attack also exist but they are not too efficient as they result in 
large test packet overhead. In this paper, we propose HRSRP 
(Hello flood attack Resistant Secure Routing Protocol) 
extension to LEACH protocol so as to protect the cluster head 
against Hello flood attack. HRSRP is base on encryption using 
Armstrong number and decryption using AES algorithm to 
verify the identity of cluster head.  The proposed technique is 
implemented in NS2, the experimental results clearly indicate 
the proposed technique has significant capability for the 
detection of hello flood attack launched for making the 
malicious node as the cluster head. 
 
Keywords:
 
wireless sensor networks, leach, hello flood 
attack, armstrong number, aes, encryption, decryption, 
cluster head.
 
I.
 
Introduction
 
ireless Sensor Network (WSN) is an 
infrastructure-less and self-configured wireless 
networks which is used to monitor physical 
conditions or environment such as sound, humidity, 
temperature, pressure, speed, pollutant levels etc. and 
so on. Sensors in WSN pass the data gathered to Base 
Station (BS) so that it can be further analyzed for further 
processing to take different decisions. Figure 1 shows 
the structure of a typical WSN. Sensor nodes in a WSN 
are very resource constrained and are susceptible to 
various attacks due to limited capacity of data 
processing, speed, storage, communication bandwidth 
etc. The complication of the implemented security 
algorithms also adds to the trouble of providing security 
to WSNs.The past proposed security techniques for WS 
Ns assumed that almost all sensor nodes are reliable 
and helpful, but the same is not true for most of the 
cases for many sensor network applications today. A 
large number of attacks are possible in WSN including 
jamming, tampering, exhausting, hello flood, collision, 
sinkhole, Sybil, denial-of-service, flooding, cloning etc.  
Hello flood attack is a network layer attack in 
WSN caused when hello packets used for neighbour 
discovery are sent or replayed by an attacker with high 
transmission power. In this way, the attacker creates an 
illusion of being a neighbour to other sensor nodes so 
that the underlying routing protocol can be disrupted, 
which smooth the progress of launching further types of 
attacks. The attacker broadcast packets with such a 
high transmission power that a large number of sensor 
nodes in the WSN choose it as the parent node or 
cluster head (CH) in case of clustered implementation. 
All messages to be broadcasted in the WSN are routed 
through this parent sensor node that increases delay. 
The attacker broadcast these hello messages to a large 
number of sensor nodes in a wide area of the WSN. 
These sensor nodes are then forced to be convinced 
that the attacker node in the network is their neighbour. 
All the sensor nodes are going to reply to this HELLO 
message from the attacker and are going to waste their 
energy. This usually results in a confusion state in the 
WSN. 
Heinzelman et al. [2] introduced a dynamic 
hierarchical clustering protocol called LEACH (Low 
Energy Adaptive  
 
Figure 1: A typical WSN 
Clustering Hierarchy) protocol for sensor networks. 
LEACH divides the WSN into small clusters of which one 
is the CH head and others sensor nodes are the cluster 
members. The cluster sensor node members send their 
gathered data to the CH, which in turn send it to the BS 
W
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by aggregating all the received data from its cluster 
members so as to reduce the redundancy. In LEACH 
the CH sensor nodes are periodically re-elected so that 
the same sensor node is not repeatedly used for the 
high energy job of the CH. LEACH operations are 
divided into two phases of Setup phase and Steady 
phase. In the setup phase, the formation of clusters with 
CH and cluster members is done for the WSN while in 
the steady phase; data are sensed and sent to the BS. 
The steady phase is longer than the setup phase and is 
done in order to minimize the overhead cost.  
LEACH protocol is a more secure protocol as 
compared to the conventional multi-hop protocols as in 
conventional multi-hop protocols, the sensor nodes 
around the BS are more attractive to compromise as 
they are the major points of aggregation and forwarders 
of all packets to the BS. While in LEACH protocol, the 
CH are the only node that directly communicate with the 
BS and the location of these CH can be anywhere in the 
WSN irrespective of the BS. More over these CHs are 
regularly randomly changed. Therefore, spotting these 
CHs is very hard for the adversary in WSN. However, as 
LEACH is a cluster-based protocol, depending 
exclusively on the CHs for aggregation of data and its 
routing, attacks on the CH are the most harmful. If any 
adversary node becomes a CH, then it can make 
possible attacks like HELLO flood attack, Sybil attack, 
selective forwarding etc.  
Hello packets in WSN are used for neighbour 
discovery but they can be used by a malicious node 
with high transmission power to launch Hello flood 
attack on CHs in WSN. A number of countermeasures 
against Hello flood attack in WSN have been proposed 
in the literature that we discussed in our previous work 
[1]. Most of the proposed countermeasures have 
limitation and need improvement for producing more 
efficient one. In this paper, we propose a HRSRP (Hello 
flood attack Resistant Secure Routing Protocol),  an 
extension to LEACH protocol and is base on encryption 
using Armstrong number and decryption using AES 
algorithm to verify the identity of the CH so as to prevent 
the WSN from Hello flood attack. The remaining paper is 
organised as follows: In section II, we discuss related 
works; the section III describes the working of HRSRP. 
In section IV, we provide the simulation of proposed 
protocol in NS2 while we end with the conclusion in 
section V.  
II.
 
Related Works
 
In this section of the paper, we discuss the work 
proposed in the past for providing secure formation of 
clusters by LEACH protocol in WSN, and the proposed 
work for selecting CHs in a secure way.
 Heinzelman et al. [2] proposed LEACH in which 
every sensor has a probability of becoming a CH 
without message exchange. This technique attempted 
to extend the network life time by making all sensor 
nodes play a role of CH. In LEACH, some sensor nodes 
with a high chance declare themselves as CHs and 
other sensor nodes join in one of them. Since, this 
method assumes no compromised sensor nodes in the
 
WSN; it has no method to protect the cluster formation 
from the malicious sensor nodes. F-LEACH [3] was
proposed in order to defend the cluster formation in 
LEACH protocol. In this proposal, when a sensor node 
declares itself as a CH, it employs the use of common 
keys shared with the BS so as to check the 
authentication of the CH declaration to the BS. Then, the 
sink securely broadcasts the authenticated CHs using 
μTESLA [4]. Normal sensor nodes in WSN join in only 
one legitimate CH. However, this method has no means 
to validate the normal sensor nodes which join in any 
cluster. To resolve this problem, Oliveira et al. [5] 
proposed SecLEACH in which the BS authenticates the 
CH nodes and further the CHs authenticate the joining 
sensor nodes. In both F-LEACH and SecLEACH, 
sensors nodes are pre-assigned some keys for 
verification before their deployment. However, both F-
LEACH and SecLEACH can help in preventing only 
external attackers from joining of the process of cluster 
formation i.e. they cannot avoid internal attacks from 
capturing CHs. 
 
Many extensions to LEACH [7-11] have been 
proposed in the past but, most of them focus on 
balancing the consumption of energy over all sensor 
nodes and extending the lifetime of the network. A few of 
them [8] deals with electing a CH securely. However, 
this technique cannot prevent a malicious node from 
declaring itself as a CH as it can defraud other nodes 
that it has a short distance to the BS along with a large 
amount of residual energy. Liu proposed a
 
cluster 
formation method in which only pre-determined nodes 
can declare themselves as CHs while other nodes can 
join any cluster either directly or via a relay node [13]. As 
any CH declaration or cluster join is authenticated by 
some pre-assigned polynomial share, the method
 
avoids any external attacker from participating in the 
process of cluster formation. In this method, a 
compromised relay node can invoke a Denial of Service 
(DoS) attack by removing the connection between CH 
and its serving nodes. Pre-determined CHs become the 
targets of attackers because their roles are fixed. Sun et 
al. [14] proposed a protected scheme for cluster 
formation which checks the protocol conformity of 
nodes in order to discriminate mean nodes from usual 
nodes. In this method, physical network
 
is transformed 
into cliques and members are openly connected to each 
other in a clique. After the formation of clique, each 
node checks that all members have the similar view of 
the clique membership. Even though the method of [19] 
has enhanced the safety
 
of [14], it supposed that no 
collisions are possible during the cluster formation. This 
assumption is difficult to satisfy without the use of any 
special measure such as TDMA schedule assignment 
and code separation. Nishimura et al. [21] proposed a 
method where all nodes allocate a trust value to each 
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 candidate of CH and the most trusted nodes are 
allowed to become CH. Otherwise, the nodes join a 
close cluster to form clusters in the network. The 
drawback of this scheme is that it produces a lot of 
communication overhead for the building of trust 
evaluation system. So, this method is not appropriate for 
resource-constrained WSNs.
  
Rifà-Pous et al. [20] proposed a protected 
cluster formation method that is based on public key 
cryptography. The scheme is composed of three 
phases; cluster discovery phase, CH designation phase, 
and cluster maintenance phase. In the phase of cluster 
discovery, all nodes in a cluster have the same view on 
the membership of cluster with each other. In the phase 
of cluster designation, a CH is elected considering the 
number times it performed the CH and number of its 
neighbours. In the phase of cluster maintenance, the 
elected CHs provide an authorization certificate to every 
member in the cluster. But, this method assumes that 
no nodes depart from the cluster discovery protocol. For 
example, if a malicious node transmits its message to 
part nodes in the phase of cluster discovery, the 
sufferers have a dissimilar view on the membership of 
cluster. Consequently, it divides a cluster into multiple 
clusters, and the divided clusters elect their CH 
respectively in the phase of CH designation. That is to 
say, this method can produce a lot of clusters under the 
selective transmission attack. Crosby et al. [21] 
proposed a trust based CH election design where every 
node provides a trust value to other nodes according to 
their behaviour and extremely trustworthy nodes 
become CHs. Every node’s behaviour is calculated by 
counting the occurrence of successful node 
transmissions and the occurrence of unsuccessful node 
transmissions. That is, the more a node succeeds in its 
transmission, the superior reputation value the node 
has. During the election of new CH, nodes with a more 
reputation value are suggested for the role of CH by 
cluster members and one of these is selected as a new 
CH. A malicious CH can put in a not guilty victim into a 
blacklist to take away its candidacy for CH in the cluster 
that is, with the number of blameless victims rises up, a 
malicious node can enlarge its winning chance. 
 
Buttyan et al. [22] also proposed a CH selection 
method which conceals the process of election from 
outside nodes using cryptographic techniques. 
However, the concealment works only for external 
attackers as a compromised node can with no trouble 
expose the selection result. Moreover, the malicious 
node can announce itself as a CH even though it is not 
eligible. Sirivianos et al. [24] proposed the Secure 
Aggregator Node Election (SANE) protocol in which all 
eligible CH members in a cluster contribute to the
 
production of a random value and a CH is elected 
randomly using this random value. SANE is classified 
into further three sub-schemes according to generating
and distributing the random value. They are based on 
Merkle’s puzzle scheme, commitment based scheme, 
and seed based scheme. Dong et al. [25] proposed a 
method that prevents outside attackers from taking part 
in a CH election process through its ID assignment 
scheme, which firmly binds a node’s ID, its 
commitments, and its polynomial shares. In this 
scheme, the nodes that do not broadcast participation 
message for CH election or explicitly transmit a non-
participation message are excluded from the CH 
candidates. The final CH is selected by arbitrarily 
selecting one node amongst the rest of the candidates. 
However, an inside attacker can change CH election 
result by avoiding the distribution of its participation 
message; it can also generate numerous CH election 
results by the process of distributing its contribution 
message only to a subset of CH candidates. Even 
though this method has a recovery system to combine 
numerous election results into one result, it requires the 
voluntary co-operation of the CH candidates. 
 
III.
 
Framework and Working of HRSRP
 
In this section of the paper, we describe our 
proposed HRSRP for the detection and isolation of Hello 
flood attack in WSN. We first discuss the WSN model 
and assumption and then we describe the working of 
proposed protocol.
 
a)
 
Network Model
 
The clustered sensor network selected in the 
paper consists of N static sensor nodes, including CH, 
member nodes, and BS. CHs are responsible for 
collecting the information within their clusters and 
passing it to the BS so as to make decisions and 
judgments. The formation of clusters is based on 
LEACH protocol. Every sensor node has a unique 
identity (ID). Following assumptions of the WSN are 
used in the proposed protocol HRSRP. 
 
1.
 
Hello flooding attack node, formed by the 
compromise of CH.
 
2.
 
The compromised node has a high transmission 
power.
 
3.
 
Except the malicious sensor node, all the nodes in 
wireless sensor network are isomorphic with the 
same initial energy, transmission power, computing 
power and internal storage structure.
 
4.
 
Once each node’s ID is allocated, it cannot be 
changed.
 
5.
 
Each sensor node is allocated unique Armstrong 
number. 
 
6.
 
The sensor nodes of the network consume the 
same energy in the same stage of the work, e.g. the 
transmission and reception of data packets in the 
process of detection.
 
b) Implementation of HRSRP 
The HRSRP is an improved secure extension to 
the LEACH protocol, so the implementation of the 
Securing Cluster Head Selection in Wireless Sensor Networks
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proposed protocol has to take advantage of the 
characteristic of LEACH clustering. LEACH protocol is 
mainly divided into two phases of set-up phase
 
and 
stable phase. In the set-up phase, all the sensor nodes 
have to follow the two guidelines of fairness criterion and 
randomness criterion. In fairness criteria all sensor 
nodes in the network have same probability to become 
a CH. While in randomness criterion, the election of the 
CH is done in a random way. The chance for a sensor 
node to become a CH in the round entirely depends on 
whether the sensor node has ever been elected as CH 
in the recent rounds and the percentage of the CH 
sensor in the WSN. When the election of the CH is over, 
every member node chooses the cluster to join on the 
basis of the maximum received signal strength until all 
the clusters are completed. In general, the 
implementation of LEACH has a longer stabilization 
phase. 
 
Each member sensor node is responsible for 
sensing the surrounding environment and forwarding 
the data to their respective CHs. After collecting 
information from cluster member nodes, each CH 
forwards it to the BS. It is vulnerable for LEACH against 
Hello flood attack due to these characteristics of 
clustering. Hello flood attack is a common routing attack 
in the network, which broadcasts a large number of 
hello message with higher transmission power to nodes 
in the network. Any sensor node that receives the hello 
message with high signal will consider the malicious 
node as CH. This malicious node may damage the 
network by selectively modifying, discarding information 
received from its neighbours.
 
c)
 
Determination of malicious CH 
 
The BS maintains record of CHs, cluster 
members, malicious nodes in the registration table as 
different sets. The values are updated as per the 
changes in the clusters and CHs. The initial values of 
these sets are
 
Set CHnode
 
= {null}, the CHs in the network.
 
Set CHmember
 
= {null}, the members of each cluster in 
the network.
 
Set CHmalicious
 
= {null}, which means the malicious 
nodes in the network.
 
Each sensor node with a certain probability (p) 
try for becoming CH based on the criterion of 
randomness and fairness. The sensor node that 
becomes a CH broadcasts the message of self-
clustering in order to attract neighbouring sensor nodes 
so as to join it. The cluster head CH(i) is selected 
according to the level of the Received Signal Strength 
(RSS) to join in a certain range of area. The members of 
the cluster as calculated by each CH are added to the 
set CHmember. 
 
i.
 
Allocation of unique ID
 
The BS allocates a unique ID to each sensor in 
the network. Whenever any sensor node request for 
becoming CH, it has to send this ID to the BS so that the 
node identification can be validated.
 
ii.
 
Allocation of unique Armstrong number
 
The BS also allocates a unique Armstrong 
number against each ID for each of the sensor node in 
the network. An Armstrong number is an m-digit base n 
number such that the sum of its (base n) digits raised to 
the power m is the number itself. For example number 
371 is an Armstrong number as 33+73+13
 
=27 + 343 
+1 = 371 which is equals to number itself. Whenever 
any sensor node request for becoming CH, it has to 
send encrypted hello message with this Armstrong 
number. Table 1 shows example registration table 
maintained at BS.
 
Table 1:
 
Registration table at BS
 
Sensor 
number
 
Allocated 
unique 
ID
 
Allocated Random 
Armstrong 
Number
 
001
 
S0001
 
153
 
002
 
S0002
 
407
 
.
 
.
 
.
 
.
 
.
 
.
 
N
  
54748
 
The flowchart in figure 2 describes the working 
of HRSRP
 
for authentication of CH by the BS. 
 
As LEACH is fragile to hello flooding attacks 
because of its characteristics and nature.
 
The compro-
 
mised non–cluster head sensor nodes have less effect 
on the performance of network with limit range. But, 
once it becomes a CH with higher transmission power, a 
large number of sensor nodes will be appealed for be-
coming one of its members in a cluster. If the malicious 
node discards or alters the packets, the circumstances 
would seriously smash the honesty and precision of the 
information in the network. The HRSRP can detect the 
presence of malicious node with fewer energy and small 
error rate, which can efficiently get better the network 
performance. 
 
IV.
 
Simulation Results
 
In this section of the paper, we present the 
results of the simulation to show the effectiveness of 
HRSRP. The simulation is carried out in ns2.35 with the 
parameters shown in table 2. 
 
a)
 
Throughput 
 
In the first experiment, we measure the sensor
 
network
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Figure 2: Flow chart of proposed HRSRP 
Table 2: Simulation parameters 
Parameter Value 
Simulator used NS 2.35 
Area (meter) 800X800 
No. of nodes 50 
Routing protocol LEACH 
Channel type Wireless 
Packet size 512 byte 
Mobility model
 
Two ray ground 
propagation model
 
throughput as this is one of the crucial network 
parameters. Network throughput refers to the average 
rate of successfully delivered packets. Throughput is 
calculated depending on a total number of packets 
received at the
 
destination in sensor network per unit of 
time. Throughput is calculated as 
 
Throughput = (Total number of packets received at the 
destination) / (simulation time)
 
Figure 3 shows the throughput analysis in the 
case of the sensor network without Hello flood
 
attack, 
under Hello flood attack, and after implementation of 
proposed HRSRP. The figure clearly shows that the 
proposed protocol after the isolation of the Hello flood 
attack results in the increase of throughput. 
 
 
b) Packet delivery ratio 
Packet delivery ratio (PDR) of a network is 
defined as the ratio of the total received packets at the 
destination to total packets generated by the source 
node. PDR is calculated as 
PDR = (Packets received/packets generated) * 100 
Figure 4 shows the PDR analysis in the case of 
the sensor network without Hello flood attack, under 
Hello flood attack, and after implementation of HRSRP. 
The figure clearly shows that the proposed protocol after 
the isolation of the Hello flood attack results in the 
increase of PDR. A high value of PDR is an indication 
that there is less packet loss in the sensor network. 
c) Delay 
The delay is defined as the average time taken 
by a packet (data) to arrive at the destination. The delay 
also includes any delay that is caused by the process of 
route discovery along with queue in data packet 
transmission. The data packets successfully delivered to 
the destinations are only counted. It is calculated as:  
Delay = ∑ (arrive time – send time) / ∑ Number of 
connections 
The lesser value of delay is an indicator of the 
better performance of the protocol. Figure 5 shows the 
end to end delay in the case of sensor network without 
Hello flood attack, under Hello flood attack, and after 
Start 
Set CHnode = {null}, 
Set CHmember = {null}, 
Set CHmalicious = {null}
Does ID found in 
the registration 
table ?
Allocate unique ID 
and Armstrong 
number to each  node
LEACH based 
clustering of 
the network
Selected CH, 
send ID to BS
Malicious node 
found, Add malicious 
node to set CHmalicious
yes
No
CH send encrypted 
Hello message using 
Armstrong no. to BS
BS decrypt the 
message using  AES 
algorithm with same 
Armstrong no.
Does message 
decrypted ?
No
Allowed as CH, Add 
node to set CHnode
yes Add CH members 
to set CHmember Continue process
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implementation of HRSRP. The figure shows that the 
proposed protocol results in the decrease in end-to-end 
delay. 
d) Overhead  
Overhead is the excess time taken by the 
protocol to deliver the packets to the destination. Hello 
flood attack increases the overhead in the sensor 
network. The routing overhead is defined as the count of 
packets used for routing in the sensor network. Figure 6 
shows overhead in the case of sensor network without 
Hello flood attack, under Hello flood attack, and after 
implementation of HRSRP. The proposed protocol 
results in decreasing the overhead of the network as 
shown in figure 6. 
V. Conclusion 
Cluster head selection in a secure way in 
clustered implementation of wireless sensor network is 
vital as all the cluster sensor members data to the base 
station is communicated through cluster head. Hello 
flood attack in wireless sensor network can be used for 
making a cluster head compromised by making use of 
high transmission power used for sending or replaying 
hello packets which are used for neighbour discovery. 
LEACH protocol is hard to attack by adversary excluding 
the case when it can become cluster head. In this 
paper, a new approach to detect and prevent HELLO 
Flood attack in LEACH protocol in wireless sensor 
networks is proposed. We propose a HRSRP (Hello 
flood attack Resistant Secure Routing Protocol) 
extension to LEACH protocol base on encryption using 
Armstrong number and decryption using AES algorithm 
to verify the identity of cluster head. HRSRP improves 
the network performance by early discovery of adversary 
and preventing the sensor nodes from associating with 
such a malicious cluster head. The implementation of 
the proposed technique in NS2 shows its efficiency for 
the factors of throughput, packet delivery ratio, delay, 
overhead. The simulation results prove that HRSRP 
expels more compromised nodes from clusters and 
suppresses the separation of clusters. Other simulation 
results also represent that HRSRP raises the quality of 
clusters and more energy efficient than an opponent 
scheme. Additional simulation will be done in the future 
by increasing the number of sensor nodes.  
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Figure 3: Throughput
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Figure 4: PDR
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Figure 5: Delay
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Figure 6: Overhead
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